Dispatch from Hungary: How will the election result affect the country’s Jews?

For the last 16 years, the Fidesz-KDNP government, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán , has ruled Hungary. Its relationship with our country’s Jewish community has been characterized by a mixture of largesse and suspicion, and a positive foreign policy towards Israel mixed with unease about domestic policies and rhetoric.

Like any Jewish community, Hungary’s Jews, numbering between 75,000 and 100,000, are far from monolithic. The two longstanding religious groupings are the Neologs (roughly equivalent to Progressive Judaism) and the Orthodox (a grouping virtually taken over by Chabad in recent years.) There are also generational differences – without overstating the point, many older Hungarian Jews hold universalist, human rights-oriented, left-wing views. By contrast, a significant number of younger Jews identify with Zionism, the State of Israel, and Israel’s current official policies.

The right-wing Fidesz-KDNP government that came to power in 2010 embodied the forces of the Hungarian right, toward which many Hungarian Jews expressed hostility. The Hungarian right wing had, until then, identified with the Horthy regime—which during World War Two enacted anti-Jewish laws and fostered strong antisemitism. The Hungarian right-wing invoked that very regime, which, in the eyes of Jews, proved to be a crucial milestone on the path leading to the Holocaust.

Hungarian democracy struggled with this legacy, but the new Orbán government recognised this problem and reached out to the Jewish community: it took important measures, including a zero-tolerance policy toward antisemitism, a generous cemetery renovation project, and synagogue restoration. In addition, it established very good relations with both Chabad and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israeli government.

Most notably, the Orbán government’s pro-Israel policy manifested itself in the fact that at the European Union or UN it often abstained on or actively vetoed decisions related to Israel. Hungary also withdrew from the ICC in protest at the court’s treatment of Israel, establishing itself as a reliable partner. Orbán also had a personally positive relationship with Netanyahu.

At the same time, elements of the Orbán government’s domestic policy alienated many Hungarian Jews: it was characterised by strongly Christian-nationalist rhetoric, a weakening of capitalism in favour of economic control by those close to the party, and significant media control, silencing the opposition for years. Moreover, it consistently reinforced its policies through hate campaigns, with nationwide poster campaigns targeting George Soros, European Union leaders, or Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and more recently, campaigning against Ukraine. George Soros’s policies are not beyond criticism, but the state-.run campaign targeting him fueled antisemitism concerns for many Hungarian Jews.

The victory of Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party, essentially the result of a protest vote was overwhelming – and included many in the Jewish community, who no longer had any sympathy for Fidesz. At the same time, some Jews had serious concerns about how the incoming government would handle the migration challenge and antisemitism, and what the relationship with Israel would look like. Prime Minister-designate Péter Magyar responded to these concerns in his international press-conference, stating that he would continue to ban migration and maintain a zero-tolerance policy toward antisemitism, but that vetoes against Israel (or Israeli policies) within the EU would be examined on a case-by-case basis and would not be automatic. He also announced that Hungary would rejoin the ICC.

This clearly means that the protective umbrella Hungary has held over Israel within the EU will disappear. At the same time, it is expected that the relationship between different parts of the Jewish community may be less strained than previously and more positive as a whole towards the government – Fidesz developed a special relationship with Chabad, but a much more strained one with other groups.

Orbán’s government generously supported Jewish organizations and communities, but expected complete loyalty in return. It remains to be seen how this policy will evolve in the future, but if that loyalty shifts toward a more liberal and democratic state, the Jewish community will not be the loser.